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I
1. INTRODUCTION
A basic solution concept for noncooperative games which has found
several applications in economics is that of a Nash equilibrium [Nash
(1951)]. Recently, Aumann (1974, 1987) introduced the idea of a cor-
related equilibrium as an extension of the Nash equilibrium in order
to allow for correlation between the player's randomizations. This
notion can be described as follows: Let Q, denote the set of states of
nature of the world and consider the game F = { (X. ,u, ,S , ,u , ) :
I i' 1 ' 1 ' 1
ra
i=l,2,...,ra} where, X. is the strategy set of player i, u. : ^ X . -> R
is the payoff of player i, S, is a partition of Q, denoting the private
information of player i and y. is the prior of player i — a probability
measure on fi. For simplicity we assume that players have the same
prior, i.e., y . h y for all i. A strategy of player i is an S.-
measurable function x. : Q -> X . . An ra-tuple of stratesies
(x* , X* , . .
.
,x*) is said to be a correlated equilibrium for the eame F,12 ra
if for all i, (i=l,2 , . .
.
,ra)
E u (x*(w) ,x*((jo)
, .
. . ,x*((o))y(ro) > T. u. (x*('a)) , . . . ,x. , . . . ,x*(w) )y('.o)^il 1 ra — ^il 1 m
Ifor every strategy x.,
A fundamental question which arises is under what conditions the
game F has a correlated equilibrium. The purpose of this paper is to
provide an answer to this question. In particular, we show that if Q
is a probability measure space, X. is a (Banach) set-valued function
defined on Q whose values are convex and weakly compact and u. is
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weakly continuous, integrably bounded and quasi-concave in the i
9
coordinate, then the game T has a correlated equilibrium. Moreover,
adopting an idea of Schmeidler (1976), i.e., by viewing the extreme
points of the set X. as pure strategies we also prove a pure strategy
3
correlated equilibrium existence result for the game F.
The proofs of our results require arguments of a rather novel-type.
However, it should be noted that the techniques which have been used
in the literature of the existence of a Nash equilibrium in games with
a continuum of players [e.g., Schmeidler (1976), Khan (1986), Yannelis
(1987) and Yannelis-Rustichini (1988)] will turn out to be useful.
Moreover, some theorems of \umann (1965) on the integration of
set-valued functions as well as extensions of Auraann's results given
by Datko (1973), Khan (1986), Rustichini (1987) and Yannelis (1988)
will play an important role.
The paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 contains
notation and definitions. The main results of the paper are stated in
Section 3 and their proof are collected in Sections 4 and 5. Finally,
some concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
2. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
2. 1 Notation
2 denotes the set of all nonempty subsets of the set A,
con A denotes the convex hull of the set A,
con A denotes the closed convex hull of the set A,
I
R denotes the Jl-fold Cartesian product of the set of real numbers
denotes the empty set.
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If X is linear topological space, its dual is the space X* of all con-
tinuous linear functionals on X, and if p c X* and x e X the value of
p at X is denoted by <p,x>.
2 .2 Definitions
4 Y
Let X,Y be topological spaces. The correspondence ((> : X ->• 2 is
said to be upper semicontinuous (u.s.c.) if the set (x e X : (})(x) C v}
is open in X for every open subset V of Y. The graph of the corre-
Y
spondence
(J)
: X > 2 is denoted by G, = [(x,y) e XxY : y e (J)(x)}.
Let (Q, J yv) be a complete finite measure space and X be a separ-
able Banach space. The correspondence (^ : fi -* 2 is said to have a
measurabl e graph if G &S ®(jj(X), where (^(X) denotes the Borel
a-algebra on X and ® denotes product a-algebra. The correspondence
([> : T -> 2 is s.-iid to be lower measurable if for every open subset V
of X the set (co e J2 : <J)(w) H V ^ 0} is an element of J . It is well
known that if t() : f^ ->• 2 has a measurable graph it is also lower
measurable [Himraelberg (1975, p. 47)]. Furthermore, if !J)(») is closed
valued and lower measurable then <})(•) has a measurable graph.
Below we define the notion of a Bochner integrable function. We
will follow the treatment of Diestel-Uhl (1977). Let (J^.'^ju) be a
finite measure space and X be a Banach space. A function f : f^ ->• X is
called simple if there exist x, ,x^,...,x in X and a^,a,^y.,,ya in I
1 2 ' n 1' 2 n -^
n
such that f = S x.X > where 'x (w) = 1 if o) e a. and x (w) = if
i-1 i i i
0) ^ a.. A function f : J^ ->• X is said to be y-measurable if there
exists a sequence of simple functions f : f^ ->• X such that
n
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lirailf (o)) - f(a))
n
= u~a.e. A u-measurable function f : J2 ->• X is
said to be B.ochner integrable if there exists a sequence of simple
functions |f : n=l,2,...} such that
lira / ilf (a))-f (00)11 duCix)) = 0.
' n
n+00 ^
In this case we define for each A. e j the integral to be J f(ai)dij(tj) =
A
lira J f (a))dy(u)» It is a standard result [Diestel-Uhl (1977, Theorem
n-»-a> A
2, p. 45)] that if f : Q -)• X is a y-measurable function then f is
Bochner integrable if and only if J II f ('a))ll dy (oj ) < » . We denote by
^-.(yjX) the space of equivalence classes of X-valued Bochner inte-
grable functions x : iTi - X normed by ;i x|| = J il x(a) )ll dy (u ) . It is well
known that normed by the functional 11 • 11 above, L (y ,X) becomes a
Banach space [Diestel-Uhl (1977, p. 50)]. We denote by S the set of
all X-valued Bochner Integrable selections from the correspondence
oX .
(j) : J2 - 2 , 1 . e . ,
S = (y e L (y,X) ; y(a3) e ^dsi) y-a.e.}
Following Auraann (1965) the integral of the correspondence (p : ^ -^ 2
is defined as follows:
X
/ (()(uj)dy(tj) = {/ y(a))dy(oj) : ye S }.
We will denote the above integral by f (j( . A correspondence ({> : Q -> 2
is said to be integrably bounded if there exists a map g z L,(y,R)
such that sup{;ix|| : x z (j)(co)} _< g(a3) y-a.e. Note that if J2 is a com-
plete finite measure space, and X is a separable Banach space and
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X
d) : J^ > 2 is a nonempty-valued correspondence with a measurable graph
(or equivalently <])(•) is lower measurable and closed valued), then
(j) : ^ -v
2" admits a measurable selection , i.e., there exists a measur-
able function f : J2 > X such that f(oj) £ (()(a)) y-a.e. 3y virtue of
this result and provided that the correspondence (}> : Q > 2 is inte-
grably bounded, we can conclude that S is nonempty and hence j<\, is
nonempty as well.
A. Banach space X has the Radon-Nikodym Property with respect to
the measure space (^,~] >y) if for each y-continuous vector oieasure
G : T > X of bounded variation there exists g e L (y ,X) such that
G(E) = j g((jo)dp(u) for all E e J . A Banach space X has the Radon-
E
Nikodym Property (RNP) if X has the RNP with respect to every finite
measure space. It is a standard result [Diestel-Uhl (1977, Theorem
1, p. 98)] that if (^
, J>u) ^s a finite measure space 1 _< p < °°
,
and X is a Banach space, then X* has the RNP if and only if
(L (u,X))* = L (p,X*) where i + ^ " 1*
p q 1-' 4
We conclude this section by noting that if X is a separable Banach
space, (q, _r,u) is a finite positive measure space and ((> : Q ->• 2 is
an integrably bounded, nonempty, weakly compact and convex valued cor-
respondence then by Diestel's Theorem [see Diestel (1977) or
Papageorgiou (1985)] we have that S is weakly compact in L^(y,X).
3. THE MAIN THEOREMS
Let Y be a separable Banach space whose dual Y* has the RNP and
(71, \ ,\x) be a separable, complete, finite, probability measure space.
As usual we interpret Q. as the states of nature of the world and
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assurae chat Q includes all the events that we consider to be inter-
esting, J will denote the a~algebra of events and obviously p is the
measure on (f2,j )•
A game r = {(X.,u.,S,) : i=l,2,...,m} is a set of triplets
(X. ,u. ,S
.
) where,111
J .(1) X. : ^ -* 2 is the strategy correspondence of player i,
m
(2) u, : n Y. -»• R is the payoff function of player i, an(
^ j=l ^
.s a(3) S. is the private information of player i, where S. i:
partition of (^ , J ) . (Note that the probability measure
\i on (^ , J ) can be interpreted as the common prior of each
player.
)
Denote by L the set of all Bochner integrable and S .-measurable
X
,
1
1
selections from the strategy set X. of player i, i.e., L =
i <v
,
1
[x. e L,(y,Y) : X, : fi -> Y is S .-measurable and x.(a)) £ X.(co) y-a.e.}.
m
Let L = n X.. Moreover, let Lc< = H L and denote the points of
A. , , i X... A.
.
1=1 1 jTtl J
L'v by X. .
The expected payoff of player i is a function g. : L„ -» R defined
by
g^(x) =
I u^(x(u)))du(u).
A strategy x* e L is said to be a correlated equilibrium for theA
game r, if for all i, ( i=l ,2 , . .
.
,m)
-7-
g,(x*) = max g.(x.,x*),
1
We are now ready to state the following result.
Theorem 3.1 : Let T = {(X.,u.,S.) : i=l,2 , , . . ,Tn} be a game satis-
fying for all i the following assumptions:
(a. 3.0) The partition S. of (Q,J ) is countable,
Y
(a. 3.1) X. : J2 > 2 is an integrably bounded, weakly compact,
convex, nonempty valued and S, -lower measurable corre-
spondence,
(a. 3. 2) u. is weakly continuous and integrably bounded,
(a. 3. 3) u, is quasi-concave in the i coordinate, i.e., for each
X, e X. = n X., u.(x.,x,) is a quasi-concave function of
1 1 .^.j'li'i ^
X. on X.
.
1 1
Then T has a correlated equilibrium.
We now turn to the existence of a pure strategy correlated
I
equilibrium. From now on until the end of this section we set Y = R .
Hence, for the game T described above X. is a correspondence from Q
R^into 2 . Moreover, we assume that for each i, S. is a sub a-algebra
of J and the restriction of \i to S. is still denoted by u« We denote
by X. the extreme points of X..
•' 1 1
A. pure strategy correlated equilibrium for the game T is an
m
e A
X* : f2 > n X, such that each x.(») is S .-measurable and for all i,
1=1 ^ ^ ^
.
( i = l , 2 , . . . , m)
/ u, (x*((i)))dy(u) 2. / u, (x. (w) ,x'. (o)) )dy(/o)
for any S .-measurable function x. : ^ - X . .
^ 1 11
We are now ready to state our second main result.
Theorem 3.2 : Let r = [(X.,u.,S.) : i=l,2,...,m} be a game satis-
fying for each i the following assumptions:
(a. 3. 4) (S2,S.,ii) is a separable, complete, finite, atomless
probability measure space,
(a. 3. 5) X, : f2 -»• 2 is an integrably bounded, compact, convex,
nonempty valued and S, -lower measurable correspondence,
m
(a. 3. 6) u. is continuous, integrably bounded and linear on H Y.
Then r has a pure strategy correlated equilibrium.
The next two sections are devoted to the proofs of our theorems.
4. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
Let L^ = II L^ . For each i define the correspondence
L,
1 J^i 2
(j) . : Lev -)• 2 by
*i^^i^ = (y^ e \ ' gi(yi»x^) = max g^(x^,x^)}.
1
^X
Also define the correspondence $ : L •> 2 by
/\
m
$(x) = H ((). (x. ).
i=l ^ ^
^X
We must show that the set-valued function $ : L -> 2 satisfies all
A
the conditions of the Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem [Glicksberg
(1952), see also Berge (1963, p. 251)]. Clearly, a fixed point of $
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is a correlated equilibrium for the game F. We begin by proving the
following fact:
Fact 4»1 ; L is weakly compact, nonempty, convex and metrizable,
Proof : It follows directly from Diestel's theorem that L„ is
1
weakly compact and therefore L„ is weakly compact as well. Obviously,
since each X,(») is convex valued, L is convex and so is L„. Since
1 A. . A
1
X,(») is closed valued and S. -lower measurable (assumption (a. 3.1)) it
follows from the Kuratowski and Ryll-Nardzewski measurable selection
theorem [Himmelberg (1975, p. 60)] that there exists an S .-measurable
function f. : Q + Y such that f.(a)) e X.do) \i-a,e. Since X. is
integrably bounded f. is also Bochner integrable, i.e., f. e L^(u,Y)
and therefore we can conclude that f. e L, . Consequently, L isLA, A.
,
1 1
nonempty and so is L = T L . Note that since (Q, j ,y) is a
1=1 1
separable measure space and Y is a separable Banach space, L.(ij,Y) is
separable. Since L is a weakly compact subset of the separable
X
.
1
Banach space L,(u,Y) it is also metrizable [Dunf ord-Schwartz (1958,
Theorem V.6.3, p. 434)]. Finally, since the set of players is finite,
Ly is metrizable [as it is the finite product of metrizable spaces,
Berge (1963, Theorem 2, p. 86)]. This completes the proof of the
claim.
Fact 4.2 ; For each i, ( i=l ,2 , . .
.
,m)
,
g.(') is weakly continuous.
m
Proof : Let |x : n=l,2,...} be a sequence in L = T ^ converg-
~^—"^"^~ n A. , , A
.
1 = 1 1
ing weakly to x e L i.e., for each i, ( i=l ,2 , . .
.
,m) the sequenceX
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• •
fx : n=l,2,...} in L converges weakly to x in L . If we show
that for all i, x converges pointwise in the weak topology of X. to x
,
then given the fact that u, is integrably bounded and weakly continuous
the result will follow from the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem.
Note that since for each i the partition S. is countable, i.e., S. =
la. ,a, ,a. , . .
.
1 the fact that x and x are elements of L„ implies that'ill' n X . ^
1
00
^
.
**'
.
X = Zx'xk, X = Zx'xk for x ' , x ' in X. and therefore we
n
, , n a. , , a. n ik=l 1 k=l 1
can conclude that x converges pointwise in the weak to topology of X,
n 1
to X . This completes the proof of the claim.
It follows from Berge's maximum theorem [Berge (1963, p. 116)]
that for each i, (!>.(•) is weakly u.s.c. Moreover, since for each i,
u. is quasi-concave in the i coordinate it follows that for each i
1 ^
and each x. e L~
,
g,(x.,x,) is a quasi-concave function of x. on L,.iX.°iii ^ 1 X.
1 1
and consequently for each i, ({).(•) is convex valued. Since g,(») is
weakly continuous and L is weakly compact, (().(•) is nonempty valued.
A.
.
1
\ ^
Thus, (}) , : L^ ->• 2 is a weakly u.s.c, closed, convex, nonempty valued
1 \
,
1
^X
^
^
correspondence and so is $ : L -> 2 defined by ^Cx) = n (j).(x),
^
i = l
'
[Berge (1963, Theorem 4', p. 114)]. Consequently, the set-valued
function $ : L ->• 2 satisfies all the conditions of the Fan-
Glicksberg fixed point theorem and therefore there exists k* e L such
that X* e $(x*). It can be easily checked that the fixed point is by
construction a correlated equilibrium for the game F. This completes
the proof of Theorem 3.1.
I
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5. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2
Denote by L„e the set of all Bochner integrable and S .-measurable
"^ X, 1
1
Q
selections from the strategy set X. of player i, i.e.,
~ l^i e l.,(y,R ) : x. : J2 > R is S .-measurable and
i
m
x.(co) £ X.Cco) y-a.e.j. Let L„e = J[ L e. Define the mapping
1 1 • A. . . A .1=1 1
TT : L (y,R^) > R^ by TiCy) = / y(u))dp(co). The integral of the set-
valued function X, is j X.(oo)dij(u) = ttCL e) = {iCy) : y e ^y^I" '
a)£f2 i i
m
We denote the above integral by JX.. Let JX = n Jx., JX. = n JX. anc
^
i = l ^ ^ j^i -"
denote the points of fX. bv x.
.
ra
Note that since by assumption (a. 3. 6) u. is linear on n Y. the
domain of the expected utility g.(x) = J u . ( x(a)) )dp (cj) is now JX and
W£f2
/a
this latter set will turn out to be equal to JX . Since for each i,
X. is compact and convex valued, by the Krein-Milman-Minkowski theorem
we have that:
(5.1) con X.(aj) = X.Coj) n-a.e.
1 1
Integrating (5.1) we obtain:
(5.2) /con X® = Jx..
Since the measure space (f2,S.,y) is atomless, it follows from Theorem
3 in Aumann (1965) that:
-12-
I
(5.3) /con X^ = /X^.
Combining (5.2) and (5.3) we have that Jx, = Jx, and therefore
For each i, (i=l ,2 , . .
.
,m) define the set-valued function
/X^
, e J i
F. : fX: -». 2 by
1 ' 1 -^
F^Cx.) = (y. z fxl : g.(y.,x.) = ".ax g.(x.,K.)}
x.e/X.
. Q J
Moreover, define the correspondence F : JX - 2 by
m
F(x) = n F.(x ).
i=l
/x'
We will show that the set-valued function F : fX -* 2 satisfies all
the conditions of the Kakutani fixed point theorem. It can be easily
seen that a fixed point of the set-valued function F is by construction
a pure strategy correlated equilibrium for the game r . He begin by
proving the following claim.
Claim 5.1 ; JX is compact and nonempty.
Proof: Since for each i, X. is lower measurable and closed valued,
1
it has a measurable graph [Hiramelberg (1975, p. 47)]. Furthermore,
since for each i, X. is integrably bounded it follows from Theorem 4
in A.umann (1965) that JX. is compact and so is fX = JX. We now show
that Jx is nonempty. Since for each i, X. is S. -lower measurable and
closed valued, by the Kuratowski and Ryll-Nardzewski measurable selec-
tion theorem that there exists an S .-measurable function f. : ^ -> R
-13-
such that f.(oj) e X.Cw) ^-a.e. Since X. is integrably bounded f. is
integrable, i.e., f. e L ([j,R ) and therefore f. £ L . Hence, L„ is
i i 1 A.
.
A.
,
1 1
ra
nonempty and so is L = n L • The latter enable us to conclude that
1 = 1 1
fX is nonempty as well. Consequently, JX is compact and nonempty as
was to be shown.
Note that since for each i, u. is integrably bounded and continuous
by virtue of the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem we can conclude
that for each i, g. is continuous. As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, it
can be easily now checked that for each i, F, is an u.s.c. closed con-
vex valued correspondence and so is F. By the Kakutani fixed point
theorem there exists x* e JX such that x* & F(x*), which implies that
for all i, (i=l,2 , . .
.
,m)
,
g.(x*) = max 2,(x.,x*), i.e., x* is a pure
1 ("v^ 111
x.eJX.
1 J 1
strategy correlated equilibrium for the game r» This completes the
proof of Theorem 3.2.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Rema rk 6.1 : Note that Theorem 3.2, i.e., the existence of a pure
strategy correlated equilibrium is based heavily on the Lyapunov
theorem. In particular. Theorem 3 in Aumann (1965) which enabled us
to obtain (5.3), i.e., [con X. = JX., is proved by means of the
Lyapunov theorem [see also Schmeidler (1976) for a similar argument
with the one used to prove Theorem 3.2].
Remark 6.2 ; In Theorem 3.2 we assumed that the strategy set of
each player is a subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean space. The
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reason for this is that we needed Lyapunov's theorem (as noted above),
a result which is false in infinite dimensional spaces [see for
instance Diestel-Uhl (1977, p. 262)]. The question which arises is
whether the argument used to prove Theorem 3.2 remains valid if the
strategy set of each player satisfies (a. 3.1). The answer is a
qualified yes. In particular, note that the key step in the proof of
Theorem 3.2 was to show that /x = /x. The latter statement was
obtained by using the Krein-Milman-Minkowski Theorem and Theorem 3 of
Aumann (1965). However, in an infinite dimensional setting (5.1) in
the proof of Theorem 3.2 becomes
(5.1') con X:(w) = X.(cj) u-a.e.
Therefore,
,e(5.2') Icon x: = fx..
1 ' 1
By a Theorem of Datko (1973) [see also Khan (1986) for a more general
statement], we have that:
(5.3') Icon X. = cifX., (where cZ denotes norm closure).
J 1 -^ 1
Combining (5.2') and (5.3') we can conclude that the aggregate set of
pure strategies is dense in the aggregate set of mixed strategies,
i.e., cUfX^ = fx. Furthermore, c£ fx^ is convex [Khan (1986, p. 261)],
and by Lemma 3.1 in Yannelis (1988), /x is weakly compact. Finally it
is easy to show that g.(») is weakly continuous. In fact, since by
assumption (a. 3. 6) u. is (norm) continuous and integrably bounded it
follows from the Lebesgue dominated converge theorem that g. is (norm)
I
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continuous. Since a. is linear so is g. and by Theorem 15 in Dunford-
Schwartz (1958, p. 422) we can conclude that g. is weakly continuous.
The rest of the argument is now similar with that adopted for the
proof of Theorem 3.2. However, in this case since cZJX = JX one can
only obtain an approximate pure strategy correlated equilibrium for
the game r
•
Remark 6.3 ; Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 remain true if the utility func-
tion of each player u. is allowed to be state dependent, i.e., u. is
m
now defined on i^ x II Y . .
Remark 6.4 ; Our results can be easily extended to abstract econ-
omies as defined in Debreu (1952) and Arrow-Debreu (1954).
I
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FOOTNOTES
This notion has been also used by Brandenburger-Dekel (1987,
p. 1394) under the name of objective correlated equilibria.
2
Note that the convexity of the strategy set of each player amounts
to a mixed strategy correlated equilibrium result and this may be
objectionable; to quote Auraann (1987, p. 11) "In view of the fact that
players may wish to use mixed strategies, the reader may question the
assumptions that each player knows his own action. There is no problem
if, as usual, one thinks of a mixed strategy simply as a random device
for helping the player make up his mind, so that in the end he does
know which action he takes." A.lso, it is important to note that when-
ever, Nash-type equilibrium existence results are applied to exchange
economies the assumption of convexity of the strategy set of each
player constitutes no real economic restriction. In particular, ex-
change economies are converted to abstract economies and the consump-
tion set of each agent in the exchange economy (which is interpreted as
the strategy set of each player in the abstract economy) is typically
assumed to be convex [see for instance Arrow-Debreu (1954) or Yannelis
(1987)].
3
It should be noted that recently, Hart-Schmeidler (1987) have
obtained correlated equilibrium results different from ours. In par-
ticular, they do not consider the case of asymmetric information.
Also, it is known that the existence of a correlated equilibrium in
a less general setting than ours can be obtained by shov^ing that Nash
equilibria are correlated and therefore the classical equilibrium
existence result of Nash is directly applicable [see for instance
Aumann (1974)]
4
A correspondence is a set-valued function for which all image sets
are nonempty.
By this we mean that for every open subset V of Y the set (o) e fi :
Xi(a)) n V * 0} is an element of 3^^. Mote that the fact that X^^ is S^-
lower measurable implies that it is also lower measurable.
Let (f : n=l,2,...} be a sequence in L,(y,Y). Then f converges
weakly to f if and only if <f
,
p> converges to <f,p> for any
p e L^(u,Y*) (recall that Y* has the RNP), which is equivalent to the
fact that <fj^X^,P> = ^^^^^^pP^ converges to <f,x^P> = <fx^,P> for any
p £ L^(ij,Y*), A ej , and each condition above implies that
(I
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<f X» .x*> = <f ,x»x*> coaverges to <fY.,x*> = <f,Y^x*> for any x* e Y*.
n A n A A A ^ '
A e 3 .
Rustichini (1987) showed that in the extensions of Theorem 3 of
Auraann (1965) given in Datko (1973) and Khan (1986) the norm closure
cannot be removed, (i.e., in expression (5.3') the norm closure cannot
be dispensed with).
-18-
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